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This study investigated whether multisensory stimulation with other-race faces can reduce 
racial prejudice. In three experiments, the faces of Caucasian observers were stroked with a 
cotton bud while they watched a black face being stroked in synchrony on a computer screen. 
This was compared with a neutral condition, in which no tactile stimulation was administered 
(Experiment 1 and 2), and with a condition in which observers' faces were stroked in 
asynchrony with the onscreen face (Experiment 3). In all experiments, observers experienced 
an enfacement illusion after synchronous stimulation, whereby they reported to embody the 
other-race face. However, this effect did not produce concurrent changes in implicit or 
explicit racial prejudice. This outcome contrasts with other procedures for the reduction of 
self-other differences that decrease racial prejudice, such as behavioural mimicry and 
intergroup contact. We speculate that enfacement is less effective for such prejudice 
reduction because it does not encourage perspective-taking. 
  





The cognitive representation of our own body is flexible and constantly updated. A 
striking illustration of this effect comes from the rubber hand illusion. Watching a rubber-
hand being stroked in synchrony with oneÕs own hand produces the feeling that the rubber 
hand is, in fact, oneÕs own (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). This 
illusion does not appear when observers simply watch a rubber hand (that is not stroked) or 
when asynchronic stimulation is given, by inducing a delay between the stroking of the 
rubber hand and an observerÕs own. Moreover, a similar effect has also been observed with 
other body parts, such as arms (Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011), and even the whole 
body (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blake, 2007; Petkova et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, faces are also susceptible to rubber hand-like effects (see, e.g., Maister, 
Tsiakkas, & Tsakiris, 2013b; Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; Tajadura-Jimnez, 
Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). When observersÕ own faces are stroked in 
synchrony with a target face, they tend to perceive the target face as more similar to their own 
(see, e.g., Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavini, & Schubert, 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-
Jimnez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). This perceptual effect is accompanied by a 
phenomenological illusion that the other face belongs to the observer. This bias in self-
recognition or Òenfacement effectÓ (Sforza et al., 2010) is not found after asynchronous 
stimulation. This indicates that synchronous, but not asynchronous, multisensory stimulation 
supports the updating of cognitive representations of the own face. 
These embodiment effects are not only informative about the characteristics of 
cognitive representations of the body, but also provide insight into social cognition. 
Embodied accounts suggest that the body experience determines sociocognitive processing 
(e.g., Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004), and research of the rubber hand and enfacement 
illusion support this claim (e.g., Bufalari, Lenggenhager, Porciello, Serra-Holmes, & Aglioti, 




2014; Fini, Cardini, Tajadura-Jimnez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 2013; Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, 
& Tsakiris, 2013a; Maister et al., 2013b; Paladino et al., 2010). For example, after 
synchronous multisensory stimulation (SMS) with an unfamiliar face, observers report more 
positive affective reactions and more conformity behaviour toward the unfamiliar face than 
after asynchronous stimulation (Paladino et al., 2010). This effect is also seen in the domain 
of emotion recognition, as SMS of the face enhances observersÕ sensitivity to othersÕ fearful 
facial expressions (Maister et al., 2013b). These findings suggest that synchronous 
multisensory stimulation blurs self-other boundaries not only with regard to physical 
appearance but also in a more social sense, by reducing differences between the self and an 
enfaced face. As a consequence, the enfaced face is held to be included in the self-space 
(Paladino et al., 2010; Schubert & Otten, 2002), by producing an overlapping of its mental 
representation with the self (see Tsakiris, 2010; Paladino et al., 2010). 
Such differences reduction also seems to be an important concept for understanding 
other social behaviours, such as intergroup relations (Billing & Tajfel, 1973; Roccas & 
Schwartz, 1993; Hall, Crisp, & Suen, 2009). For example, when observers are asked to list 
attributes that people of their own and another race share, the differences between these 
groups are blurred, which produces a positive effect in the reduction of prejudice (Hall et al., 
2009). Other tasks, such as behavioural mimicry and intergroup contact, are also based on the 
reduction of self-other differences and have been employed to decrease prejudice toward 
outgroup members (see Crips & Turner, 2009; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault, 2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; 
Turner, Crisp, & Lambert, 2007). For example, when observers mimic actions of an other-
race actor, such as reaching and grasping a glass, they subsequently show reduced implicit 
racial prejudice towards that race in the Affect Misattribution Paradigm (Inzlicht et al., 2012; 
Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Similarly, contact between members of different 




groups seems to reduce prejudice toward the outgroup (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), even 
when this intergroup contact is imagined (Crips & Turner, 2009; Turner et al., 2007; Turner 
& Crisp, 2010). For example, observers who imagine contact with an elderly person 
subsequently demonstrate less implicit bias toward the elderly compared to control observers 
(Turner & Crisp, 2010; Experiment 1), and similar results are found when non-Muslim 
observers imagine contact with Muslims (Turner & Crisp, 2010; Experiment 2). 
This research shows that SMS, intergroup contact and behavioural mimicry share two 
important features. Firstly, all of these tasks require that observers have some contact with 
other people. In SMS, this contact is produced through mirror-like reflection, as observers 
receive specular stimulation with the onscreen face (see, e.g., Sforza et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 
2008). In behavioural mimicry, the contact with the other is produced through the imitation of 
othersÕ actions (Inzlicht et al., 2012). And in the case of intergroup contact, the contact is 
produced face-to-face or simply can be imagined (see, e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner 
& Crisp, 2010). Secondly, in all of these tasks the difference between the self and others is 
reduced by increasing the overlap of their mental representations (see, e.g., Hall et al., 2009; 
Paladino et al., 2010; Farmer, Tajadura-Jimnez, & Tsakiris, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2012; 
Turner & Crisp, 2010). 
If SMS, imagined intergroup contact and behavioural mimicry share these features, 
and imagined intergroup contact and behavioural mimicry reduce prejudice toward outgroup 
members, then it is possible that SMS produces a similar effect on prejudice reduction. So 
far, the evidence on this is mixed (for a review, see Maister, Slater, Sanchez-Vives, & 
Tsakiris, 2015). For example, after the enfacement of an other-race face, observers exhibit a 
more pronounced visual remapping of touch effect for that particular face, which is an 
increased tactile sensitivity in observers when viewing another person being touched (see 
Cardini, Tajadura-Jimnez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 2012; Marcoux et al., 2013). This effect 




seems to be amplified in observers who have a stronger implicit bias against other-race 
people (Fini et al., 2013). However, this study did not include a post-stimulation measure of 
racial prejudice. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether the increased visual 
remapping of touch was simply due to an increased preference toward the enfaced other-race 
face (see, e.g., Paladino et al., 2010) or whether this reflects a more general decrease of racial 
prejudice. 
In another study, visuo-tactile stimulation increased participantsÕ body-ownership 
experience over a rubber hand from another race (Farmer et al., 2012). This created an 
enhanced skin conductance response in observers when painful stimuli, such as a hypodermic 
syringe, were thrust into this rubber hand. Observers who reported a stronger sense of 
ownership over the other-race rubber hand also showed reduced implicit racial prejudice, as 
measured with the Implicit Association Task (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
However, these effects were independent of whether synchronous or asynchronous 
stimulation was delivered. Similarly, another study found reduced racial prejudice after 
observers embodied an other-race virtual body in comparison to same-race or purple-skinned 
avatars (Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, & Slater, 2013). However, whereas this effect was observed 
after synchronous visuo-motor stimulation, in which the virtual body mimicked participantsÕ 
own movements, it was not reliable in comparison with a non-embodied condition in which 
such synchrony was absent. This indicates that it might be a general feeling of ownership 
over embodied hands and bodies, and not synchronous stimulation, that produced the 
reduction in racial prejudice in these studies (see also Maister et al., 2013a).  
In light of these findings, the present study sought to investigate further whether 
synchronous multisensory stimulation can increase the feeling of ownership over an other-
race person and whether this can specifically reduce racial prejudice. For this purpose, we 
focused on faces as these provide a particularly distinctive physical feature for the perception 




of the self and others (Devue & Brdart, 2011). Compared to hands and other body parts, the 
face also provides a richer source of information of othersÕ emotional and mental states, 
which promotes social interaction (Richeson, Dovidio, Shelton, & Hebl, 2007). 
Consequently, the face might also act as an important stimulus for the reduction of racial 
prejudice through multisensory stimulation. 
In Experiment 1 and 2, observers received facial tactile stimulation that was 
synchronous with the stroking of an other-race onscreen face, or received no stimulation 
while the other-race face was being watched (i.e., neutral stimulation). In Experiment 3, 
observers then received either synchronous or asynchronous stimulation with an other-race 
face. To measure the effect of this manipulation on racial prejudice, we employed the IAT 
(Greenwald et al., 1998), which provides an implicit measure of intergroup attitudes toward 
different ethnic groups, nationalities, religions and sexes (see Schnabel, Asendorpf, & 
Greenwald, 2008). In the current study, the IAT compares the fluency, in terms of reaction 
times, with which Caucasian observers match stimuli that correspond either to ingroup or 
outgroup categories (e.g., same- and other-race faces) with words that carry a positive or 
negative meaning (e.g., peace and anger). In this paradigm, an increase in reaction times to 
match outgroup related stimuli with positive words and a decrease to match outgroup related 
stimuli with negative words is considered to reflect implicit prejudice toward the outgroup. 
Racial prejudice was also measured explicitly with Lepore and BrownÕs (1997) subtle racial 
prejudice questionnaire. This questionnaire measures racial prejudice on Likert scales and is 
suitable for British participants (see Lepore & Brown, 1996). 
If SMS of the face reduces racial prejudice similar to other procedures of differences 
reduction, such as imagined contact and behavioural mimicry (e.g., Inzlicht et al., 2012; 
Turner & Crisp, 2010), then observers should show less prejudice toward the outgroup after 
synchronous stimulation than in the neutral and asynchronous conditions. If, on the other 




hand, observersÕ general feeling of ownership over an other-race face is related to such 
prejudice reduction, independent of the type of stimulation (see Farmer et al., 2012; Maister 
et al., 2013a), then observers with the strongest sense of such ownership should show the 
least racial prejudice. 
 
Experiment 1 
This experiment investigated whether SMS of the face produces a modulation in 
prejudice toward outgroup members, as is the case in imagined intergroup contact and 
mimicry paradigms (see, e.g., Turner & Crisp, 2010; Inzlicht et al., 2012). Observers were 
exposed to synchronous and neutral stimulation with the onscreen face of an other-race 
model. After the stimulation stage, racial prejudice was measured implicitly, using the name-
race IAT (Hall et al., 2009), and explicitly, with the subtle racial prejudice questionnaire 
(Lepore & Brown, 1997). If multisensory stimulation can reduce racial prejudice, then 
observers should show less prejudice toward the modelÕs ethnic group after stimulation in the 




Thirty Caucasian females, with a mean age of 19 years (SD = 2.1), participated in this 
study. All were students at the University of Kent, who gave their informed consent to take 




Preparation of multisensory stimuli 




To create the stimuli for the multisensory stimulation, three black female models were 
video-recorded in full colour. Two different videos were recorded for each model. In both 
videos, the models look straight at the camera with a neutral expression. In the first video, 
which was recorded for the synchronous condition, the modelsÕ right cheek was stroked with 
a cotton bud every two seconds for two minutes. In the second video, the models did not 
receive any tactile stimulation. This video was used in the neutral condition  
The videos were presented in full-screen mode on a 21ÕÕ screen monitor placed 
approximately 75 cm from observers. In full-screen mode, the faces measured approximately 
9 (W) by 19 (H) degrees of visual angle. Example stills from this video footage are provided 
in Figure 1. 
 
The name-face IAT 
To measure racial attitudes, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 
1998) was displayed with Inquisit software (Millisecond Software). The stimuli in this IAT 
have been used in previous research (Hall et al., 2009) and comprise names for black and 
white people and words with a positive or negative meaning. The names were suitable for a 
British context and consisted of John, Paul, Brian, Pete, Robert, Katie, Sara, Susie, Melanie, 
and Emily for white people, and of Latonya, Tanisha, Malika, Teretha, Lakisha, Leroy, 
Rasaan, Tyree, Deion, and Lamont for black people. The positive words were Rainbow, Gift, 
Joy, Paradise, Laughter, Cuddle, Glory, Gold, Kindness, and Peace, while the negative 
words were Sadness, Anger, Vomit, War, Hell, Slum, Slime, Filth, Stink, and Cockroach.  
In this name-race IAT, the observersÕ task is to classify words as quickly as possible 
as positive or negative, and names as black or white. These stimuli were presented in the 
centre of the screen in black Arial font at size 36. The task is comprised of seven blocks. In 
Block 1, observers were presented with words, which had to be classified as positive or 




negative by pressing the ÔzÕ or ÔmÕ key on a standard computer keyboard. In Block 2, 
observers were asked to classify names as ingroup (i.e., white names) or outgroup exemplars 
(i.e., black names) with the same two keys. In Block 3, observers performed the combined 
categorization of words and names, by requiring pressing, for example, the ÔzÕ key if the 
stimulus was a white name or a positive word and the ÔmÕ key if the stimulus was black or a 
negative word. This was followed by Block 4, which was identical to Block 3. Block 5 was 
identical to Block 1 but with reversed keys. In Block 6, observers then performed the 
combined categorization, but in this case the name-word relation was reverted compared to 
Blocks 3 and 4. Thus, if Blocks 3 and 4 combined white with positive and black with 
negative, then Block 6 combined white with negative and black with positive. Finally, Block 
7 was identical to Block 6. Each block contained 24 trials. Assignment of the different 
categories to the response keys was counterbalanced across participants.  
In line with previous work (e.g., Hall et al., 2009), Blocks 1, 2 and 5 were practise 
trials, whereas Blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7 were the critical blocks that were used to calculate a 
measure of prejudice. This prejudice measure was based on the reaction times with which 
Caucasian observers matched stimuli that correspond either to ingroup or outgroup categories 
(i.e., white and black names) when the same response keys are also used to classify words 
that carry a positive or negative meaning (i.e., peace and anger). As all of our observers were 
Caucasian, the pairings white/positive words and black/negative words were congruent in this 
framework. On the other hand, white/negative words and black/positive words were 
incongruent.  
 
Prejudice scale  
Lepore and BrownÕs (1997) racial prejudice scale was used to measure subtle explicit 
racial prejudice. This scale comprises 15 statements to assess prejudice toward black people, 




which are listed in Table 1. Participants rate their agreement with each statement on a 7-point 
Likert scale, ranging from Òstrongly disagreeÓ to Òstrongly agreeÓ. Scores on this scale range 
from 15 to 105, with a midpoint of 60 and high scores indicating lower prejudice. Previous 
research (see Lepore & Brown, 1997) has shown that this questionnaire is suitable for the 




A questionnaire was administered to assess observersÕ enfacement experience. A set 
of 8 items was taken from Tajadura-Jimnez et al. (2012a; see also Maister et al., 2013b). 
These items consist of statements that assess the subjective enfacement experience and are 
provided in Table 2. Observers record their agreement with each statement on a 7-point 
Likert scale, ranging from Òstrongly disagreeÓ to Òstrongly agreeÓ. These items are analysed 
separately but an overall enfacement score can also be calculated by summing all scores. A 
high overall score indicates that observers felt that the onscreen face had become integrated 
with the internal representation of their own face during the stimulation stage (see Tajadura-
Jimnez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012b).  
 
Procedure 
In this experiment, observers first watched a two-minute video of a black model being 
stroked on the cheek with a cotton bud (in the synchronous condition) or without any tactile 
stimulation (in the neutral condition). While watching the videos of the synchronous 
condition, an identical cotton bud to that seen in the video was used to provide specular 
tactile stimulation to the observersÕ cheek. During the neutral video, no tactile stimulation 
was administered. After each of the videos, observers performed the IAT, the prejudice scale 




and the enfacement questionnaire. Each participant performed this sequence twice, once for 
the synchronous condition and once for the neutral condition. The order of these conditions, 
and the identity of the model in each condition, was counterbalanced across observers over 




To determine whether SMS affects how observers feel about the onscreen face, 
responses to the enfacement questionnaire were analysed. These data are provided in Figure 2 
as mean Likert responses to each of the items for the synchronous and the neutral condition. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, SMS influenced observersÕ feelings about the onscreen face. This 
effects was such that observers were more likely to report that this face was their own face in 
the synchronous condition than in the neutral condition (items 1, 2 and 3), paired sample t-
tests, all ts(29) ≥ 3.28, ps < .01. Observers also reported feeling a greater resemblance 
between their own and the onscreen face in the synchronous than in the neutral condition 
(items 4 and 6), both ts(29) ≥ 2.42, ps < .05. In addition, observers were more likely to report 
that their own face was out of control and that the experience of their face was less vivid than 
normal in the synchronous than in the neutral condition (items 5 and 7), both ts(29) ≥ 2.33, ps 
< .05. However, observers did not feel that they were imitating the other person (item 8), 
t(29) = 1.94, p = .06. 
In addition, the overall enfacement score was calculated for each observer by 
summing the scores for items 1 to 8. A 2 x 2 mixed-factor ANOVA, with the within-subjects 
factor stimulation (synchronous vs. neutral) and the between-subjects factor block order 
(synchronous first vs. neutral first) did not show a main effect of block order, F(1,28) = 0.16, 
p = .68, ƞ
2
p = .00, or interaction between block order and stimulation, F(1,28) = 1.13, p = .29, 






p = .03. However, a main effect of stimulation was found, F(1,28) = 18.23, p < .001, ƞ
2
p = 
.39, which reflects a higher total enfacement score in the synchronous (M = 29.5, SD = 10.9) 
than the neutral condition (M = 22.1, SD = 9.8). 
 
Racial prejudice measures 
In a further step of our analysis, the scores for the IAT and the racial prejudice scale 
were analysed. For the IAT, D scores using the improved scoring algorithm (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) were computed. This score is based on the differences between the 
average latency data from the combined critical blocks (i.e., blocks 4 and 7), divided by the 
standard deviation of all latencies for both blocks (for further details, see Greenwald et al., 
2003). The resulting scores range between -2 and +2. In this study, the pairings of 
white/positive words and black/negative words were congruent. Thus, positive scores 
indicated a preference toward ingroup members (white people in our case), which is 
interpreted as a sign of racial prejudice (e.g., Hall et al., 2009). Individual D scores are 
presented in Figure 3 and show overall similar performance across stimulation conditions 
(synchronous M = 0.43, SD = 0.35; neutral M = 0.35, SD = 0.39). In fact, only 13 of 30 
observers recorded a lower prejudice score in the synchronous than the neutral condition. In 
addition, these scores were also similar across block order (synchronous first M = 0.32, SD = 
0.39; neutral first M = 0.45, SD = 0.42). A 2 (stimulation: synchronous vs. neutral) x 2 (block 
order: synchronous first vs. neutral first) mixed-factor ANOVA did not show a main effect of 
stimulation or block order, or an interaction, all Fs(1,28) ≤ 1.90, ps ≥ .17, ƞ
2
p ≤ .06. 
For Lepore and BrownÕs racial prejudice scale, responses to items 1, 6, 10, 11 and 14 
were reversed, in line with the standard evaluation of this questionnaire. An overall score was 
then calculated for each observer by adding items 1 to 15 for each condition. These scores 
were similar across stimulation conditions (synchronous: M = 71, SD = 10; neutral: M = 70, 




SD = 10) and block order (synchronous first: M = 70, SD = 14; neutral first: M = 71, SD = 
15). The main effects of stimulation and order, and the interaction between these factors, 
were not significant, all Fs(1,28) ≤ 2.37, ps ≥ .14, ƞ
2
p ≤ .01. 
Overall, the scores from the IAT and the racial prejudice scale therefore suggest that 
SMS did not affect observersÕ racial prejudice levels. However, it is conceivable that the 
absence of prejudice reduction here relates to the within-subject repetition of these measures. 
To explore this possibility, we repeated the data analysis for the first block only on a 
between-subject basis. These scores are also similar across the synchronous and neutral 
conditions for the IAT (synchronous M = 0.40, SD = 0.42; neutral M = 0.57, SD = 0.41), 
t(28) = 1.13, p = .26, and the prejudice scale (synchronous M = 70, SD = 11; neutral M = 70, 
SD = 8), t(28) = .29, p = .97. 
Recent research has also shown that the degree of ownership that observers 
experience over an other-race rubber hand relates to their racial prejudice (Maister et al., 
2013a). Thus, it is still possible that the feeling of ownership over the onscreen face affected 
racial prejudice in the current study, regardless of the type of stimulation delivered. To 
explore whether such a relationship exists, Pearson correlations were conducted between the 
total enfacement score and the IAT and the explicit prejudice scale. This showed no 
correlation between the total enfacement score and the IAT, r(58) = -.05, p = .68, or between 
the total enfacement score and the prejudice scale, r(58) = -.01, p = .93. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 explored whether SMS of the face modulates racial prejudice. This was 
investigated by comparing a stimulation condition in which observersÕ faces were stroked in 
synchrony with an other-race face with a neutral condition in which neither the observers nor 
the onscreen face were stroked. The enfacement illusion was measured with an established 




questionnaire (Maister et al., 2013b; Tajadura-Jimnez, et al., 2012a), while racial prejudice 
was measured implicitly with the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and with the explicit racial 
prejudice scale (Lepore & Brown, 1997). ObserversÕ scores in the enfacement questionnaire 
indicated a persistent subjective enfacement effect after SMS that was evident in seven out of 
eight items. This result supports previous research, by showing that it is possible to enface 
other-race faces (Bufalari et al., 2014; Fini et al., 2013). However, we did not find an effect 
of SMS on racial prejudice, both when this was measured with the IAT and the racial 
prejudice scale. Thus, SMS did not appear to reduce implicit or explicit racial prejudice. 
Two possible reasons may explain the absence of racial prejudice modulations in our 
experiment. Firstly, it remains possible that observers represent the onscreen modelÕs features 
better after synchronous stimulation than in the neutral condition. However, this enhanced 
representation might not be strong enough to modulate racial prejudice. Secondly, it is also 
possible that SMS is able to modulate racial prejudice but neither our implicit (the IAT) or 
explicit (Lepore and BrownÕs subtle racial prejudice scale) measures are sufficiently sensitive 
to detect such a modulation. In line with this reasoning, recent research has questioned the 
validity of the name-race IAT to measure racial prejudice, as the preference toward ingroup 
names (i.e., white names in our case) could reflect an effect of familiarity toward those names 
rather than racial prejudice toward the outgroup (i.e., black people; see van Ravenzwaaij, van 
der Maas, & Wagenmakers, 2011). To rule out these possibilities, we conducted a second 
experiment in which a different version of the IAT was used. 
 
Experiment 2 
This experiment is identical to Experiment 1, except that the name-race IAT was 
replaced with a face-race version (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). In this 
test, the black- and white-associated names are replaced with black and white faces. This IAT 




cannot be undermined by (lack of) familiarity with the race stimuli (van Ravenzwaaij et al., 
2011) and should therefore provide a more sensitive measure. As in Experiment 1, we used 
this face-race IAT to explore whether observers would show less racial prejudice after 




Thirty new Caucasian students from the University of Kent, with a mean age of 19 
years (SD = 3.1), participated in this study for course credits or payment. All were female, 
gave informed consent for participation, and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except for the IAT. In this 
experiment, the face-race IAT was applied (see Dasgupta et al., 2000). This particular IAT is 
comprised of eight white faces and eight black faces and words with positive or negative 
meaning (the same words as in Experiment 1). All face images were presented in greyscale 
format and measured maximally 104 by 138 pixels at a screen resolution of 72 ppi. As in 
Experiment 1, observers classified the faces according to their ingroup or outgroup status 





The data for the enfacement questionnaire are provided in Figure 4, as mean Likert 
responses to each of the items for the synchronous and neutral conditions. As can be seen in 




Figure 4, SMS affected how observers reported to feel about the onscreen face. This effect 
was such that observers were more likely to report that this face was their own in the 
synchronous condition than in the neutral condition (items 1, 2 and 3), all ts(29) ≥ 2.06, ps < 
.05. Observers also reported feeling a greater resemblance with the onscreen face in the 
synchronous than in the neutral condition (items 4 and 6), both ts(29) ≥ 2.72, ps < .05. In 
addition, observers were more likely to report that the experience of their own face was less 
vivid in the synchronous than in the neutral condition (item 7), t(29) = 2.05, ps < .05. 
However, an effect of SMS was not always evident, as observers did not feel that their face 
was out of control (item 5), t(29) = 1.50, p = .14, or that they were imitating the onscreen face 
(item 8), t(29) = 1.80, p = .08. Finally, for the overall enfacement score, a 2 (stimulation: 
synchronous vs. neutral) x 2 (block order: synchronous first vs. neutral first) mixed-factor 
ANOVA showed a main effect of stimulation, F(1,28) = 13.24, p < .001, ƞ
2
p = .32, due to a 
higher enfacement score in the synchronous (M = 27.1, SD = 10.0) than the neutral condition 
(M = 19.9, SD = 7.0). The main effect of order and the interaction between factors were not 
significant, both Fs(1,28) ≤ 0.47, ps > .49, ƞ
2
p  ≤ .01.  
 
Racial prejudice measures 
As in Experiment 1, a D score was computed for the IAT. Individual D scores are 
illustrated in Figure 5 and show overall similar performance across stimulation conditions 
(synchronous M = 0.21, SD = 0.27; neutral M = 0.25, SD = 0.28). In addition, the scores 
were also similar across block order (synchronous first M = 0.23, SD = 0.29; neutral first M = 
0.44, SD = 0.30). This was confirmed by a 2 (stimulation: synchronous vs. neutral) x 2 (block 
order: synchronous first vs. neutral first) mixed-factor ANOVA, which did not show main 
effects or an interaction, all Fs(1,28) ≤ 0.38, ps > .54, ƞ
2
p  ≤ .01. ObserversÕ scores were also 
similar across the stimulation conditions (synchronous: M = 72, SD = 12; neutral: M = 71, 




SD = 12) and block order (synchronous first: M = 73, SD = 16; neutral first: M = 70, SD = 
17) in the subtle racial prejudice questionnaire, which did not show main effects or an 
interaction, all Fs(1,28) ≤ 0.74, ps > .39, ƞ
2
p  ≤ .02. 
Once again, we also explored whether the absence of prejudice reduction is due to the 
repetition of the IAT and the prejudice scale, by analysing the first block only. These scores 
were similar across the synchronous and neutral conditions for both the IAT (synchronous M 
= 0.20, SD = 0.26; neutral M = 0.25, SD = 0.21), t(28) = .58, p = .56,  and the prejudice scale 
(synchronous M = 74, SD = 13; neutral M = 69, SD = 10), t(28) = 1.03, p = .31. We also 
analysed again whether racial prejudice was modulated by the subjective feeling of 
ownership over the onscreen face, regardless of stimulation condition. No correlations were 
found between the total enfacement score and the IAT, r(58) = -.06, p = .61, or the prejudice 
scale, r(58) = .17, p = .18. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 explored further whether SMS of the face modulates racial prejudice. In 
contrast to Experiment 1, the face-race IAT was used (Dasgupta et al., 2000). This test avoids 
possible familiarity effects of the name-race IAT test as consequence of the bigger experience 
that people might have with ingroup names (see van Ravenzwaaij, 2011). Despite these 
changes, the main findings of Experiment 1 were replicated. Thus, observers felt a stronger 
subjective enfacement illusion after synchronous stimulation than in the neutral condition. 
This effect was such that observers were more likely to feel that the onscreen face was their 
own. This result supports previous research by showing that it is possible to enface other-race 
faces (Bufalari et al., 2014; Fini et al., 2013). As in Experiment 1, however, we also did not 
find an effect of SMS or the subjective embodiment experience on implicit or explicit racial 
prejudice. 




Although the face-race IAT in Experiment 2 does not suffer from the limitations of 
the name-face IAT in Experiment 1, it is still possible that this test is not sufficiently sensitive 
to detect differences in racial prejudice between conditions here. Both of these IATs compare 
two complementary categories (i.e., black and white people). Thus, these traditional versions 
of the IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) give a measure of 
implicit attitudes toward the outgroup based on the comparison with the ingroup (Karpinski 
& Steinman, 2006; Maister et al., 2013a). Such relative measures can create ambiguity in the 
interpretation of IAT scores. For this reason, we conducted a third experiment in which a 
single-category IAT was employed. This test does not include same-race stimuli, but only 
measures attitudes toward other-race people to provide a more direct measure of racial 
prejudice (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). 
We added a further manipulation in an attempt to improve the sensitivity of the 
stimulation paradigm. The synchronous and the neutral displays are similar, in the sense that 
the video content of both condition is congruent with observersÕ experience (i.e., either 
synchronous stimulation or no stimulation at all). Consequently, it is possible that these 
conditions are too similar to modulate racial prejudice. To provide a stronger contrast, the 
neutral condition was replaced with an asynchronous stimulation condition in Experiment 3. 
In this condition, observers watched the stroking of the onscreen face and also received 
concurrent tactile stimulation of their own face. However, this stimulation was applied with a 
one-second delay, so that it occurred out of synchrony with the onscreen face. A between-
subjects design was employed to avoid potential confounding effects from receiving both 
types of stimulation (i.e., synchronous and asynchronous). 
 
Experiment 3 




Experiment 3 modified the stimulation paradigm and the IAT in a further attempt to 
increase the sensitivity of our measures. In the stimulation task, the neutral condition was 
replaced with asynchronous stimulation, which is a common comparison condition for both 
the rubber hand illusion and the enfacement paradigm (see, e.g., Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 
2012a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). In the asynchronous condition, observers receive the same 
tactile stimulation as in the synchronous condition, but this is administered with a one-second 
delay to the observed stimulation of the onscreen face. Compared with the synchronous 
condition, the asynchronous condition therefore provides temporal incongruence between 
what observers feel when they are touched and the touch that they see applied to the onscreen 
model. If such stimulation produces an enfacement effect that also modulates racial prejudice, 
then observers should show less prejudice toward the modelÕs ethnic group after synchronous 
than asynchronous stimulation. 
In addition, the IAT was also replaced with a single-category version, which does not 
contrast attitudes to the outgroup with the ingroup, but measures attitudes toward the 
outgroup only (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Maister et al., 2013a). For this reason, the 
single-category IAT is considered a more direct measure of observersÕ attitudes toward other-
race people (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). In contrast to the preceding experiments, this IAT 
was administered on a between-subjects basis, so that observers were only exposed to one of 
the stimulation conditions (i.e., synchronous or asynchronous). However, observers now 
performed the single-category IAT twice, prior to and after the stimulation stage, to 









Sixty Caucasian students from the University of Kent, with a mean age of 19 years 
(SD= 4.9), participated in the experiment for course credit or payment. All reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Half of these participants were allocated to the synchronous and 
half to the asynchronous stimulation condition. 
 
Stimuli 
This experiment is identical to the preceding experiments, except for the following 
changes. In the stimulation task, the neutral condition was replaced with an asynchronous 
stimulation condition. In this condition, observers always watched the same videos as in the 
synchronous condition, which the face of a modelsÕ right cheek being stroked with a cotton 
bud every two seconds for two minutes. While watching these videos, an identical cotton bud 
to that seen in the video was used to provide specular tactile stimulation to the observersÕ 
cheek either in temporal synchrony with the onscreen face, in the synchronous condition, or 
with a temporal offset of one second, in the asynchronous condition. To fully accommodate 
the asynchronous condition, two new items were also included in the enfacement 
questionnaire (see items 9 and 10 in Table 2). These items assessed the source of the tactile 
sensation and sought to determine the extent to which observers associated the touch of the 
cotton bud on their own face with that of the onscreen face. 
In addition, the standard IAT was replaced with a single-category version. As in the 
preceding experiments, this IAT is comprised of words and faces but only black faces were 
included. Observers have to categorize words as either positive or negative and black faces, 
using either the ÔzÕ or ÔmÕ key on a standard computer keyboard. The task consisted of two 
different blocks. Positive words and black faces shared the same response key in one block, 
whereas negative words and black faces shared a response key in the other block. Each of 
these blocks contained 24 practice trials and 72 experimental trials (for further details, see 








In the experiment, observers began by performing the single-category IAT and the 
score of this test was used as a baseline measure of racial prejudice. Synchronous or 
asynchronous stimulation was then administered by stroking observersÕ faces with a cotton 
bud at two-second intervals, while they watched a video of a black female being stroked at 
the same rate. In the synchronous condition, this stimulation was administered in time with 
the onscreen face. In the asynchronous condition, the tactile stimulation of the observer and 
the onscreen face was offset by one second. The allocation of observers to these conditions 




Observers were more likely to report that the black onscreen face was their own in the 
synchronous than the asynchronous condition (see items 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 6), all ts(58) ≥ 
3.13, ps < .01. Observers were also more likely to report that their face was out of control in 
the synchronous than the asynchronous condition (item 5), t(58) = 2.25, p < .05. In addition, 
observers were more likely to feel that they were imitating the onscreen face in the 
synchronous condition (item 8), t(58) = 2.88, p < .01, and that the cotton bud stroking their 
own face and the cotton bud stroking the onscreen face were the same (items 9 and 10), both 
ts(58) ≥ 2.52, ps < .05. However, despite the clear convergence in felt resemblance between 
observersÕ own and the onscreen face, they did not report that these faces actually began to 
resemble each other (items 4 and 6), both ts(58) ≤ 1.89, ps > .07. In addition, observers also 




did not report that the experience of their own face was less vivid than normal (item 7), t(58) 
= 1.93, p = .07. Finally, the overall enfacement effect, by combining scores for all items, was 
stronger in the synchronous (M = 33.6, SD = 11.9) than the asynchronous condition (M = 
23.2, SD = 9.0), t(58) = 3.81, p < .01. 
 
Racial prejudice measures 
The scores for the single category IAT were analysed according to Karpinski and 
Steinman (2006). This adapted D score for the single category IAT is calculated by 
subtracting the average response times when other-race faces shared the same key with 
negative words from the average response times when other-race faces shared the same key 
with positive words (for further details, see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Thus, a positive 
score reflects a positive attitude toward other-race people. Individual scores in the single 
category IAT are presented in Figure 7. As can be seen in the figure, these scores were 
overall similar for the synchronous (pre-test M = -.06, SD = .18; post-test M = -.01, SD = .14) 
and the asynchronous conditions (pre-test M = -.04, SD = .18; post-test M = -.02, SD = .11). 
This was confirmed by a 2 x 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects factor time (pre-test vs. 
post-test) and the between-subject factor condition (synchronous vs. asynchronous). This 
showed neither a main effect of time, F(1,58) = 1.50, p = .24, ƞ
2
p = .02, or condition, F(1,58) 
= 0.02, p = .85, ƞ
2
p  < .01, and no interaction between factors, F(1,58) = 0.19, p = .59, ƞ
2
p < 
.01.To explore whether racial prejudice was modulated by observersÕ feelings of ownership 
over the onscreen face, Pearson correlations were also conducted between the total 
enfacement score and the post-test IAT score. This correlation was not significant, r(58) = 
.17, p = .18. 
 
Discussion 




This experiment explored whether SMS with an other-race face modulates racial 
prejudice by comparing synchronous and asynchronous stimulation of observersÕ faces. 
Before and after the stimulation, observers performed the single-category IAT to provide an 
implicit measure of their attitudes toward other-race faces. As in previous experiments, 
observers reported a stronger subjective enfacement illusion in the synchronous condition. In 
contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, which compared synchronous stimulation with a neutral 
condition, in which no stroking was administered to the onscreen face or the observers, this 
effect was now found by comparing synchronous with temporally asynchronous stimulation. 
This effect was such that observers were more likely to report that the onscreen face was, in 
fact, their own. Despite this clear multisensory stimulation effect, an effect of SMS on racial 
prejudice was not found. This replicates the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
General discussion 
This study investigated whether multisensory stimulation with an other-race face 
produces an enfacement effect that can reduce racial prejudice. In Experiment 1, Caucasian 
participants were exposed to synchronous stimulation, whereby their own face was stroked in 
synchrony with an observed black face. This was compared with a neutral condition, in which 
no tactile stimulation was delivered. Racial prejudice was measured implicitly, with the 
name-race IAT (e.g., Hall et al., 2009), and explicitly, with the subtle prejudice questionnaire 
(Lepore & Brown, 1997). After synchronous stimulation, observers were more likely to feel 
that the onscreen face ÔwasÕ their own face and ÔbelongedÕ to them. This effect was 
consistently found, across seven of the eight items on the enfacement questionnaire. 
However, this change in the onscreen face ownership experience was not accompanied by a 
modulation of racial prejudice, both on the implicit and explicit measures. 




Further experiments explored whether the stimulation paradigm and the racial 
prejudice measures can be modified to improve the sensitivity of this approach. In 
Experiment 2 the name-face IAT of Experiment 1 was replaced with a face-race version 
(Dasgupta et al., 2000), which removes possible familiarity confounds. For example, the 
name-race IAT cannot measure racial prejudice if observers cannot attribute ethnic origin 
accurately to the name stimuli (see van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011). Despite this change, 
Experiment 2 replicated the main findings. Thus, observers exhibited a clear enfacement 
effect after synchronous stimulation with the onscreen face, but this did not affect implicit or 
explicit racial prejudice. Finally, Experiment 3 also compared synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation and employed a single category IAT to provide a more specific measure of racial 
prejudice attitudes against another ethnic group (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Once 
again, observers were more likely to feel that the other-race onscreen face was their own after 
synchronous stimulation, but this did not reduce racial prejudice. 
These findings converge with previous research by showing that it is possible to 
embody physical features of an other-race hand (Maister et al., 2013a) or face (Fini et al., 
2013; Bufalari et al., 2014). In contrast to previous work, however, a positive effect of SMS 
of the face on prejudice reduction was not found. For example, a recent study has shown that 
after the enfacement of an other-race face, an increased visual remapping of touch effect (i.e., 
the tactile sensitivity caused by watching another person being touched) for the other-race 
face is found up to the level normally associated with an own-race person (Fini et al., 2013). 
This could suggest a reduction of racial prejudice after the SMS of the face. However, as the 
visual remapping of touch effect was measured exclusively for the enfaced face, it is also 
possible that this effect reflects an increase of positive attitudes toward the enfaced face, but 
not more generally toward its race. This explanation would be consistent with the finding that 
SMS produces positive affective reactions toward enfaced faces (e.g., Paladino et al., 2010). 




The finding that SMS of the face does not reduce racial prejudice might also appear to 
contradict studies that have observed such effects after the embodiment of other-race avatars 
and hands (Farmer et al., 2012; Maister et al., 2013a; Peck et al., 2013). However, these 
studies observed reductions in racial prejudice independent of whether synchronous or 
asynchronous stimulation was delivered. This indicates that it might have been the general 
feeling of ownership, and not synchronous stimulation, that produced the reduction of racial 
prejudice in previous work. 
The current results clearly differ from other procedures that rely on a similar 
mechanism of differences reduction for prejudice reduction (for a review, see Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000), such as intergroup contact, shared attribute generation (Hall et a., 2009) and 
behavioural mimicry (e.g., Inzlicht et al., 2012; Tuner & Crisp, 2010). Therefore, the 
question arises of why SMS is unable to modulate racial prejudice, when other methods of 
differences reduction do. A possible explanation might lie in the repetition of the IAT and the 
questionnaire for measuring racial prejudice, which might have reduced the sensitivity of our 
paradigm. However, this seems unlikely considering that a reduction of racial prejudice has 
been observed for the rubber hand illusion with such repetitions (Maister et al., 2013a; for 
similar results, see Peck et al., 2013). Moreover, our current findings persist when the results 
are analysed for the first experimental block only, which avoids repetition of the tests (see 
Results of Experiment 1 and 2). 
Another possibility is that observersÕ prejudice was already low (i.e., at floor level) at 
the start of the current experiments and therefore could not be susceptible to the current 
manipulation. Across the three experiments, observersÕ scores fell just above the midpoint of 
the IAT scale (e.g., at ~ 0.4 in Experiment 1, with the scale ranging from -2 to +2). Thus, 
these scores rule out a floor (or ceiling) effect and indicate some prejudice toward the other 
race. Previous studies have successfully modulated racial prejudice on the IAT with other 




manipulations despite reporting similar baseline scores (see, e.g., Hall et al., 2009; Maister et 
al., 2013a; Peck et al., 2013). This indicates also that we did not fail to obtain an enfacement 
modulation because observersÕ racial prejudice was too low. 
Alternatively, it might be possible that SMS of the face can affect self-recognition 
(Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a) and social cognition 
processes (Paladino et al., 2010), but the involved mechanism cannot modulate racial 
prejudice. For example, such differences could be found if observers can integrate the 
onscreen face into their own perspective during enfacement, but, conversely, are unable to 
adopt the modelÕs perspective (see Petkova et al., 2011). In other words, observers might tend 
to perceive the onscreen face as more similar to their own after enfacement, but not vice 
versa (Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a, 2012b). Thus, modulation of racial prejudice might not 
have occurred in the current experiments because observers perceived the other-race faces as 
more similar to their-own race, instead of perceiving themselves as more similar to the other 
race. The responses of the enfacement questionnaire cannot distinguish these possibilities 
(see items 6 and 7 in Table 2), but embodiment studies with hands (Longo et al., 2008) and 
faces support this idea (Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
This own-perspective bias appears to be a critical difference between embodiment and 
other manipulations which decrease racial prejudice, such as behavioural mimicry (Inzlicht et 
al., 2012), shared attribute generation (Hall et al., 2009), or intergroup contact (Turner & 
Crisp, 2010). In these procedures, observers must take the modelÕs perspective and should 
therefore ÒlookÓ more like the model. In the case of behavioural mimicry, for example, 
observers have to copy a modelÕs action. The current findings therefore suggest that such 
perspective-taking might be an important factor for prejudice reduction. 
Finally, although SMS of the face or hand does not modulate racial prejudice, there is 
evidence that a general ownership feeling over (embodied) other-race stimuli relates to 




observersÕ prejudice. This effect has been demonstrated in Caucasian observers who, 
independent of the administered type of multi-sensory stimulation, exhibit less prejudice if 
they also report a strong sense of ownership over black hands (Farmer et al., 2012; Maister et 
al., 2013a; Peck et al., 2013). While this indicates that the strength of feeling of ownership 
over other-race stimuli might be another important factor for prejudice reduction, the current 
experiments did not show a link between such feelings over an enfaced black face and racial 
prejudice. This raises the questions of why embodiment of other-race hands modulates racial 
prejudice but of faces does not. 
Faces are particularly distinctive physical features and are important not only for 
recognizing others but also for self-recognition. Moreover, whereas several 
neuropsychological studies have reported denial of ownership over body parts such as hands 
or feet in brain-damaged patients (see, e.g., Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997; Giummarra, Gibson, 
Georgiou-Karistianis, & Bradshaw, 2008), deficits in self-recognition of faces appear to be 
less frequent and are, in most of the cases, transient (see Brdart & Young, 2004). This raises 
the possibility that other peoplesÕ faces are more difficult to embody than other body parts, 
such as hands. In line with this reasoning, phenomenological evidence suggests that the 
enfacement illusion is less vivid than both the rubber hand and full-body illusions (Botvinick 
& Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Sforza et al., 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
From a cognitive perspective, these differences between findings could indicate that 
different body illusions reflect different aspects of self-identity. For example, psychometric 
studies have found a self-identification component in the rubber illusion and the enfacement 
illusion (see Longo, Schr, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008; Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 
2012b). However, this component seems to differ in its statistical weight and structure in both 
illusions. In the case of the rubber hand illusion, this component is constituted of the 
subcomponents ownership (i.e., the feeling that the rubber hand was part of the body), 




location (i.e., the feeling that the rubber hand was in the same place as the own hand), and 
agency (i.e., the feeling of being able to move the rubber hand; see Longo et al., 2008), and 
accounts for 26% of the total variance in the data. In the case of the enfacement illusion, on 
the other hand, no subcomponents for self-identification were found (Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 
2012b), but this component itself accounted for the 44% of the total variance. It has been 
proposed that this reflects the different importance that faces and hands have for self-identity, 
which appears to be stronger for faces (see Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012b). If faces are more 
strongly tied to an observerÕs own identity than other body parts, then this might be part of 
the explanation of why general feelings of ownership over an other-race hand or body can 
modulate racial prejudice (independent of whether synchronous or asynchronous stimulation 
is applied, as in Farmer et al., 2012; Maister et al., 2013a; Peck et al., 2013), but over an 
other-race face cannot (as in the current experiments). 
In conclusion, our results converge with previous reports that SMS does not modulate 
racial prejudice. In contrast to other procedures that can decrease racial prejudice, such as 
intergroup contact and behavioural mimicry, the absence of a similar effect in an enfacement 
paradigm might have occurred because observers perceive the embodied other-race faces as 
more similar to themselves than vice versa. Such egocentric perspective-taking might reflect 
the importance of faces for self-identity. 
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TABLE 1. The Subtle Prejudice Questionnaire 
 
Subtle prejudice questionnaire items  
1. It makes sense for minority groups to live in their own neighbourhood because they share more and get along 
better than when mixing with whites. 
2. I consider our society to be unfair to black people. 
3. It should be easier to acquire British citizenship. 
4. The number of black members of parliament is too low and political parties should take active steps to increase 
it. 
5. Minority groups are more likely to make progress in future by being patient and not pushing so hard for change. 
6. Given the present high level of unemployment, foreigners should go back to their countries.  
7. The right of the immigrants should be restricted (1), left as they are (4), extended (7). 
8. If many black persons moved to my neighbourhood in a short period of time, thus changing its ethnic 
composition, it would not bother me. 
9. If people move to another country, they should be allowed to maintain their own traditions. 
10. Once minority groups start getting jobs because of their colour, the result is bound to be fewer jobs for whites. 
11. Those immigrants who do not have immigration documents should be sent back to their countries. 
12. Some black people living here who receive support from the state could get along without it if they tried. 
13. Suppose that a child of yours had a child with a person of very different colour and physical characteristics 
than your own. If your grandchildren did not physically resemble the people on your side of the family, you would 
be very bothered (1), not bothered at all (7). 
14. It is unfair to the people of one country if the immigrants take jobs and resources. 
15. I would not be concerned if most of my peers at the university were black. 
 
  




TABLE 2. The Enfacement Questionnaire 
 
Enfacement Item 
1. I felt like the otherÕs face was my face. 
2. It seemed like the otherÕs face belonged to me. 
3. It seemed like I was looking at my own mirror reflection. 
4. It seemed like my own face began to resemble the other personÕs face. 
5. It seemed like my own face was out of my control. 
6. It seemed like the otherÕs face began to resemble my own face. 
7. It seemed like the experience of my face was less vivid than normal. 
8. I felt that I was imitating the other person. 
9. The touch I felt was caused by the cotton bud touching the otherÕs face. 
10. The touch I saw on the otherÕs face was caused by the cotton bud touching my own face 
 
	  




FIGURE 1. Example video stills from the synchronous/asynchronous condition (left panel) and 









FIGURE 2. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the synchronous and the neutral 
condition in Experiment 1. Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
  




FIGURE 3. Individual performance in the name-race IAT for the synchronous and neutral 
condition in Experiment 1.  
 
  




FIGURE 4. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the synchronous and the neutral 
condition in Experiment 2. Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001. 
 
  




FIGURE 5. Individual performance in the face-race IAT for the synchronous and neutral 
condition in Experiment 2. 
 
  




FIGURE 6. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the synchronous and the 
asynchronous condition in Experiment 3. Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001. 
 
  




FIGURE 7. Individual performance for the pre- and post-test IAT of the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions in Experiment 3. 
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